Physical AI, Explained · Part 11
Strategy while models, compute and hardware get cheaper
Read this part in the book →Three inputs to robotics are falling in price at once. Models grow more capable with each release, computation becomes cheaper per operation with each hardware generation, and the physical parts of a robot, from arms, motors and cameras up to complete humanoids, are becoming commodities: interchangeable goods sold mainly on price, where no single supplier can charge much more than another. In parallel, the largest companies in the world are entering the field. Frontier AI labs, chip makers, large social media and search companies, and car and humanoid makers building their own robots all now treat robotics as a market worth owning.
For a smaller company this raises two strategic questions. The first is what it can own that keeps its value while everything beneath it gets cheaper. The second is how it can keep growing for five to ten years without being crushed by a competitor with far greater resources. The answers below draw on the evidence assembled in earlier parts. They are an interpretation of that evidence, and reasonable people disagree with parts of it.
11.1 What each trend makes cheap
- Models. One general model now matches its maker's fine-tuned specialists with no extra training (a reported result). A fine-tuned specialist is a copy of a model given additional training on one narrow task; when a single general model performs as well without that step, the specialist's extra engineering stops being an advantage. Strong robot foundation models, large models pretrained on broad robot and internet data and then adapted to particular robots and tasks, are already released as open source. Techniques also spread quickly: once a group publishes early results, the method, the architecture and often the training recipe can be reproduced, and others catch up within months. Any lead built on technique alone is therefore temporary. General robot intelligence appears to be following the path general language intelligence took, improving every year and becoming available to everyone.
- Compute. Each new generation of accelerator chips performs more operations per unit of cost and energy, and each algorithmic improvement (more efficient architectures, lower-precision arithmetic, better training schedules) reduces the computation a given capability needs. Together these lower the cost of running a model of fixed capability year after year. Distillation, training a small "student" model to imitate the outputs of a large "teacher", makes it practical to train a large model in a data centre and then run a compact version on the robot's onboard computer, where power, heat and latency limits are strict. Total demand for computation is still rising faster than supply, so the price of the most advanced capacity stays high, but the cost of any particular level of capability keeps falling.
- Components. Fourteen manufacturers sell arms under $10,000, a dozen humanoids are available to buy or lease, and leader-follower rigs cost under $2,000 (RCSV figures). A leader-follower rig is a teleoperation setup in which a person moves a lightweight "leader" arm by hand and a powered "follower" arm copies its joint positions, which is the standard way to record demonstration data cheaply. Chinese manufacturing, with its dense supplier networks for motors, gearboxes, sensors and electronics, pushes these prices down further.
The general pattern is that anything a large company can buy, download or train by spending more money will become cheaper for everyone. The model, the computing power and the robot body all fall into this category, and a company whose only asset is one of them has no lasting advantage, because a better-funded competitor can match it by writing a larger cheque. What keeps its value is whatever takes time in the physical world: experience accumulated at real sites, relationships built over years, data that exists only where robots have actually worked. None of this can be downloaded, and a larger budget does not make it happen faster.
11.2 What does not commoditize
Six assets hold their value as the layers beneath them get cheaper: - Data from real customer sites. This is the only data that matches the exact conditions the robot will face: the real lighting, the real clutter, the real variation in parts and packaging, the real mistakes people make. Models trained on data from other settings suffer from distribution shift, a drop in performance when the inputs at deployment differ statistically from the inputs seen in training, and site data is the most direct remedy. Nobody can scrape it from the internet, and as fleets grow it will likely outgrow every other source (4.7). Even those who argue that the model itself is the lasting advantage (7.9) agree that deployment data is what would make it so. - Knowledge of customer workflows. This means knowing where in a customer's process a robot helps most, what success looks like in measurable terms (the napkin grade, the throughput target), and what the unusual cases are: the damaged carton, the part that arrives upside down, the shift change when the line stops. Such knowledge is rarely written down. It is learned on site, one customer at a time, and it determines whether a technically capable robot actually earns its keep. - Trust and a track record. Industrial buyers judge suppliers on safety records, uptime history and how problems were handled when they occurred. Above all, a customer choosing to roll out across many of its sites requires far more than a successful pilot (7.6), because a pilot proves that the robot can work while a multi-site rollout requires confidence that it will keep working, be supported and be maintained. A newcomer cannot buy that history, however much capital it raises. - Being built into customers' operations. A horizontal supplier, one that sells a component or capability used across many industries and many other companies' machines, tends to stay in place once integrated, because removing it means redesigning, retesting and requalifying the systems that depend on it. Economists call this a switching cost. The same logic applies to a team that knows how to deploy, support and update hundreds of robots in the field, since that capability is organisational and takes years to rebuild elsewhere. - Data operations. A data collection pipeline includes the capture devices, the labour partners who perform demonstrations, the logistics of moving equipment and people to sites, quality control on the recordings, and the consent and legal arrangements that make the data usable. Building one can take a whole first year. The result is hard to copy quickly because each piece depends on relationships and procedures, not on money alone. - How fast the company learns. One useful definition of intelligence is the speed at which a new skill is acquired, and the same definition applies to companies. A team that can turn a new customer task into a reliable deployment in days, by collecting the right few hours of data (4.6) and knowing exactly how to fine-tune and validate on it, will grow faster than a team that needs months for the same step. This speed comes from accumulated tooling, process and experience, and it improves with every task completed.
Why it matters: Each of these assets becomes more valuable as models, computing and hardware improve, because better and cheaper tools let a company deploy more robots faster, and every deployment adds to the assets.
11.3 Choosing a layer that gains when others improve
Robotics is splitting into layers, much as computing did after the mainframe era (8.1), when a single vendor supplying the whole machine gave way to separate markets for chips, operating systems and applications. The emerging robotics layers are chips, simulation and development tools, the general model, the robot body, and the application layer, meaning the customer's actual workflow and the robot's job within it. Large companies are concentrating on the lower layers. Chip makers sell computing power and simulation tools. Frontier labs and large technology companies build general models. Car and humanoid makers build complete robots, often using their own factories as the first customer.
The strongest position for a smaller company is a layer that improves every time the layers below it improve. Economists describe such layers as complements: goods whose value rises when the price of a related good falls. When a lab releases a better model, an application company that can switch models (Part 10) immediately has a better product without having paid for the research. When hardware gets cheaper, each robot earns a better return on its cost. When computing gets cheaper, the cost of serving each customer falls and margins grow. Every advance by a large company then helps the smaller company instead of threatening it. Software companies prospered for decades in exactly this way while chip makers competed fiercely with one another, because every faster chip made existing software more capable and new software possible.
The weakest position is competing directly with a large company at the layer it is paid to improve. A company whose only advantage is a slightly better general model is racing labs with far more computing power, more researchers and more data, and its lead will last only until their next release. A company whose only advantage is a slightly cheaper arm is competing with manufacturers whose scale gives them lower unit costs, better supplier terms and the ability to absorb losses longer.
The debate: The opposing case holds that the model layer itself will accumulate an advantage, because the best model wins the most deployments and therefore gathers the most data (7.9), and the shared intelligence layer predicted in 7.1 is a bet on the same outcome. If that case is right, a few well-funded labs will dominate the model layer, and for everyone else the advice holds either way: be the best partner to the leading model makers, and own the deployments they need.
11.4 Loops that compound
A loop compounds when each round makes the next round easier or cheaper, so that progress accelerates over time instead of growing in a straight line. Five such loops matter in robotics, and the strongest companies run several at once: 1. The data loop. Deploy robots, collect data on the customer's real task, use it to improve the robot there, and win more sites on the strength of the result. Each new site contributes different objects, layouts and conditions, and that variety improves the model's ability to generalise, which helps every other site (3.12). The loop is slow to start, since the first sites must be won with little data, and fast once running. 2. The customer-visible loop. Customers will not train a supplier's robot for free, and they are often reluctant to share operational data at all. They do share it when they can see their own robot improve after each round of data (4.7), because the exchange is then direct: their data buys them a better robot. Making that improvement visible, through measured success rates and throughput on their own task, is part of the product. 3. The learning-speed loop. As the base model and the company's own data improve, each new task needs less fresh data to reach reliable performance, because more of the required skill is already present in the model and fine-tuning only has to supply what is specific to the task. In one reported case, a factory task went from needing more than a month of data to under a day. Cheaper new tasks mean more tasks per customer, which produces more data and further shortens the next task. 4. The cost loop. Historically the real barrier to automation was not the price of the robot but the cost of integrating it: custom fixtures, programming every motion by hand, and engineering time at each site (7.7). General models lower that setup cost. Cheaper deployment makes it worthwhile to serve customers who were previously too small to justify the integration effort, which enlarges the market. This is an instance of the Jevons paradox, the observation that making a resource cheaper to use often increases total consumption of it instead of reducing it (8.8). 5. The fleet loop. When every robot runs one shared model, an improvement can be pushed over the network to every robot at every site at the same time (7.6), in the way software updates reach phones. A failure case found and fixed at one customer upgrades all of them, so the fleet as a whole learns from the experience of each unit. The loop requires disciplined testing before each release, since a faulty update reaches every site just as quickly.
Why it matters: A company running these loops becomes harder to catch every month, however large the competitor, because a new entrant starts with no deployments, no site data and no track record, and money cannot compress the time needed to acquire them.
11.5 Staying relevant for five to ten years
Nine rules for a smaller company that intends still to matter in a decade: 1. Do not compete on what large companies are paid to improve. General models, computing power and standard parts will get better and cheaper whether or not a small company invests in them. The sensible course is to use them and to build so that each can be replaced when a better one appears. 2. Own the last step to the customer. That means the customer's specific task, site, data, quality standard and uptime commitment. This is where general capability turns into revenue, and it is slow, local, physical work: site surveys, integration, operator training, maintenance visits. Large companies typically do this poorly at scale because it does not reward the standardisation their organisations are built around. 3. Take risk in only one place. Buy everything that is already proven good enough, and concentrate engineering risk on the part that creates the value (5.5). A project that is simultaneously inventing new hardware, a new model and a new market multiplies its chances of failure. 4. Keep the model and the robot separate. A clean interface between the two, for example a defined set of observations going into the model and a defined action format coming out, lets a company adopt the best available model and the cheapest suitable body as each improves, instead of being locked into one choice. In software engineering this is called modularity: components that interact only through well-specified interfaces can be changed independently. 5. Deploy one task at a time. A perfect general robot is not a prerequisite for a business. Deploy the skills that have been mastered, earn revenue from them, and start the flywheel turning (7.5); each deployed task funds and informs the next. 6. Measure progress on paid tasks. A metric tied to work customers pay for keeps the team from optimising for demonstrations (6.1), which can be staged, filmed after many attempts, or performed under conditions that never occur on a real site. 7. Use the weaknesses of large companies. Physical deployment is slow even for the largest companies (7.1), because it depends on site access, safety approval and customer schedules that capital cannot accelerate. Operations do not scale like software, since each additional site needs people and equipment. And robotics is a fairer contest than language was, because nobody has the data yet (8.5). Speed of decision, focus on a narrow problem and closeness to customers are real advantages in the early years. 8. Use structural advantages where they are real. Rules favouring domestic AI and a trusted supply chain outside China can give lasting advantages with government-funded and security-conscious buyers (8.6), who may be required to verify the origin of components and software. These advantages are worth pursuing only where the rules actually apply to the intended customers. 9. Get the timing right. Being too early earns nothing (8.4): a company that tries to sell a capability before it is reliable spends its capital on pilots that do not convert. The discipline is to watch for the moment a capability becomes reliable enough for a paid task, measured in success rate and interventions on the real job, and then move fast.
11.6 How a large company could still win, and a moat test
Four developments could still favour a large company: - A model that works anywhere without new data. If general models become good enough to perform well at any site with no new data, which is the ideal described in 6.6 and is known in machine learning as zero-shot performance, then knowledge about individual sites loses much of its value. Advantage would shift further toward distribution, trust and owning the customer relationship, areas where established companies with large sales forces are already strong. - Large companies with their own demand. A car or electronics maker with its own factories can deploy thousands of robots internally. It controls the sites, needs no sales cycle and can tolerate early failures, so it generates data and scale that no startup can match in that setting. The constraint is that internal deployments cover the owner's own processes, which may not represent the wider market. - Bundling. A platform company can sell models, simulation and chips together, pricing the bundle so that any one piece appears nearly free and squeezing competitors who sell only one of them. - Hardware price wars. Subsidised manufacturing can push hardware prices below cost and wipe out hardware profit margins, eliminating any company whose business depends on earning them.
A moat, in strategy, is an advantage that protects a business from competitors over time, as a moat protects a castle. To test any claimed moat, ask: "If a large company released this capability for free tomorrow, would we still win?" If the answer is no, the advantage is only a feature, something that improves the product today but that a competitor can neutralise by matching it. Deployment data, trust across many sites, workflow knowledge and a fast learning loop usually pass the test, because releasing a model does not transfer any of them. A slightly better model or a slightly cheaper part usually does not.
Why it matters: Put together, the evidence points to one position. Begin with specific, paid work in places that already exist, where the variable tasks around current equipment are what hold production back. Build the minimum robot each job needs from standard parts (2.2), and train one shared model across every configuration, so the variety of robot bodies becomes variety in the data (3.10). Start from the best open models, fine-tune them on demonstrations from real work, and let each deployment improve through imitation, correction, and practice (3.7). Sell the work the robot does, and measure progress only by tasks customers pay for.