Polymorph/Physical AI, ExplainedGlossary

Physical AI, Explained · Part 8

Markets and capital

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8.1 Horizontal vs. vertical

Industries organise themselves along two broad lines. A vertically integrated company owns most or all of the layers that make up a product within one area: a car company that designs its own driverless system, writes its own software and assembles its own vehicles is an example. A horizontal company does the opposite. It specialises in one layer, such as a chip, an operating system or a piece of autonomy software, and sells that layer to many builders who assemble the rest. The two models make money differently. A vertical company earns its margin on the finished product and controls its whole experience; a horizontal company earns a smaller slice from each customer but across a much larger base, and its strength grows with the number of products that depend on it.

One autonomy software company deliberately models itself on a chip supplier. Rather than building the finished machine, it aims to be engineered into many manufacturers' products, where, once validated and certified, it becomes expensive and slow to remove. In the chip industry, securing a place in a customer's product design in this way is called a design-win. A design-win is valuable because the customer's engineering, testing and supply planning are built around the chosen part, so switching to a rival would mean repeating that work. The supplier then earns revenue for the life of the product, often for years.

Robotics will probably split into layers the way computing did. In the 1950s and 1960s, a business bought a room-sized computer from one manufacturer, whose technicians installed it, maintained it and often wrote its software. Humanoid companies operate much like this today, supplying the machine, the software and the on-site support as a single package. Computing later separated into chips, operating systems and applications, each supplied by different firms, and software companies stopped making their own processors. Separation of this kind happens when the interfaces between layers become stable and well defined, so that a part made by one firm reliably works with parts made by others. The robotics equivalent would be a wide variety of robot bodies built on a shared layer of robot intelligence. One possible form is a single dominant robot model used by many hardware makers, in the way many phone manufacturers share one operating system, with chips as the one layer that ends up concentrated among a few suppliers.

There is nevertheless a strong case for going vertical early. Buying each component from a specialist supplier looks sensible when every sourcing decision is judged on its own, but the decisions add up to strategic exposure. Suppliers can move up the value chain: a chassis maker that sells to robot companies can start selling complete robots of its own, turning its former customers into resellers of a competitor's product. A long chain of suppliers is also slow to change, because every design revision must be negotiated across several firms with their own schedules and priorities, and this matters when the product changes every few months. Each interface between suppliers is, in addition, an opening for a newcomer to insert a better part and capture margin. The electric-car industry followed this pattern. Chinese carmakers that built most of their parts in-house went from marginal players to dominant ones, and one leading maker produces about 75% of its parts itself, which lets it redesign a vehicle and its components together and cut cost at every step. Robotics shows early signs of the same dynamic: about 87% of humanoids shipped in 2025 were Chinese, and one leading humanoid maker produces 86% of its components in-house (figures from the article cited in Sources).

Integration does not have to be permanent. Industries tend to integrate while the product is changing quickly, because the cost of coordinating across company boundaries is highest when designs are still moving, and to specialise once the product settles and interfaces can be fixed in standards. Owning the stack also does not mean making every part. Commodity components such as fasteners, bearings or standard connectors can still be bought (2.2), while the elements that determine how fast the product improves, namely the robot's design, its software and model, and its deployment, stay in-house. The aim is control over the rate of improvement of the whole system, not self-sufficiency for its own sake.

8.2 Who owns the customer

The company that holds the customer relationship decides, to a large extent, what the business can do and what it will want to do. The customer determines the requirements, the sales cycle, the regulatory obligations and the kind of evidence needed to close a deal. A company selling to the military must meet procurement rules, security clearances and long qualification programmes, and it becomes organised around them; a company selling to consumers lives on brand, price, distribution and support at scale. Over time the two become very different organisations, even if they started with similar technology.

Owning the customer is not always the best position. A new technology company often lacks the brand, service network, financing arrangements and trust that an established manufacturer has built over decades. In those cases it can be better to let the incumbent keep its brand and its customer relationship while the newcomer supplies the technology underneath. One autonomy company, for example, runs self-driving trucks under another manufacturer's brand: the manufacturer sells and services the vehicle, and the autonomy company provides the driving system. The trade-off is that the supplier gives up some margin and direct customer insight in exchange for faster distribution and lower selling costs.

8.3 Market size for general robot models

Language models offer a useful comparison. In 2016 it would have been hard to estimate the market for general language models, because AI was then sold as narrow products, one for translation, another for speech recognition, another for spam filtering, each trained for a single task. Once a single general model could perform many such tasks, the addressable market turned out to be most of digital knowledge work, wherever text is read, written or analysed.

The equivalent market for general robot models is physical labour. Today's robots cost six or seven figures partly because each one is engineered and programmed for a single job: integrators design custom fixtures, write task-specific motion programs and tune the system on site, and that engineering is a large share of the total cost. When the task changes, much of that work must be redone. General software that runs on many kinds of hardware, and that can be taught a new task with demonstrations rather than reprogramming, could reduce this integration cost sharply and make automation viable for jobs that currently do not justify it. This is a projection, and it depends on the technology working reliably in real settings.

8.4 Timing

Timing errors are punished in both directions. A company that arrives two years early typically runs out of money before the market exists; one that arrives two years late finds the market already crowded. Being early earns nothing, because there is no consolation prize for having been right first. One driverless-car company that was technically ahead of many rivals was shut down anyway after a serious public incident led regulators to withdraw its permission to operate, which showed that technical lead alone does not secure survival.

Enabling technologies can also exist long before they become useful. Wearable capture, in which a person wears sensors or cameras that record their movements while performing a task, was known to work by 2018. The data it produced had no good use, however, until training techniques developed for language models, such as large transformer architectures able to learn from varied demonstrations, matured in 2024. A company built around wearable capture in 2018 would have had the right data source and no way to turn it into a capable robot.

8.5 Why small teams can compete

In language modelling, the training data already existed in the form of the public internet, so the main constraint was computing power, and whoever spent most on computing tended to win. Robotics is more open. Nobody yet holds a large body of robot interaction data, because such data must be physically collected, through teleoperation, wearable capture or deployed robots, at real cost and real time. A large budget therefore cannot buy a head start in the way it could with internet text.

Large companies still have real advantages: more money, more experienced staff, more computing capacity, and the ability to collect data quickly once they commit to a direction. A small team's opening is focus. By going deep on specific paid work, it can collect data from deployments it already runs, which yields examples drawn from exactly the conditions its robots must handle, along with revenue and customer feedback. This creates a data flywheel, in which deployments generate data, data improves the model, and a better model wins more deployments. Competition should be expected to arrive fast. Once any company shows early results in a niche, others are capable of following quickly.

8.6 Value capture and geopolitics

8.7 Capital structures

Robotics companies are typically financed in stages. Early rounds, often called seed and Series A, fund the team and the first prototypes on the strength of the founders and the idea; later rounds fund manufacturing, deployment and scaling on the strength of measured traction. Each round sells a share of the company at a price, and existing holders are diluted, meaning their percentage ownership falls as new shares are issued. Because robotics is capital-intensive (hardware must be designed, built, tested and deployed before revenue scales), founders and investors in the field encounter a wider range of financing structures than in pure software.

8.8 Jevons paradox

Jevons paradox is the observation that when a resource becomes cheaper or more efficient to use, total consumption of it often rises rather than falls. It was first noticed with coal: more efficient steam engines used less coal per unit of work, which might have been expected to reduce coal demand, but the lower cost of power made steam engines worthwhile in many more industries, and total coal consumption grew. The effect occurs when demand is highly sensitive to price, so that a fall in cost unlocks enough new uses to outweigh the savings on existing ones.

Applied to robotics, cheaper robot labour will do more than substitute for existing labour spending. It will also expand the market by making it economic to automate tasks that were never worth automating at previous costs, such as low-volume, highly varied or intermittent work for which a custom-engineered robot could never pay back its integration cost. The size of the eventual market therefore cannot be estimated simply from current spending on the labour that robots would replace.


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