Physical AI, Explained · Part 8
Markets and capital
Read this part in the book →8.1 Horizontal vs. vertical
Industries organise themselves along two broad lines. A vertically integrated company owns most or all of the layers that make up a product within one area: a car company that designs its own driverless system, writes its own software and assembles its own vehicles is an example. A horizontal company does the opposite. It specialises in one layer, such as a chip, an operating system or a piece of autonomy software, and sells that layer to many builders who assemble the rest. The two models make money differently. A vertical company earns its margin on the finished product and controls its whole experience; a horizontal company earns a smaller slice from each customer but across a much larger base, and its strength grows with the number of products that depend on it.
One autonomy software company deliberately models itself on a chip supplier. Rather than building the finished machine, it aims to be engineered into many manufacturers' products, where, once validated and certified, it becomes expensive and slow to remove. In the chip industry, securing a place in a customer's product design in this way is called a design-win. A design-win is valuable because the customer's engineering, testing and supply planning are built around the chosen part, so switching to a rival would mean repeating that work. The supplier then earns revenue for the life of the product, often for years.
Robotics will probably split into layers the way computing did. In the 1950s and 1960s, a business bought a room-sized computer from one manufacturer, whose technicians installed it, maintained it and often wrote its software. Humanoid companies operate much like this today, supplying the machine, the software and the on-site support as a single package. Computing later separated into chips, operating systems and applications, each supplied by different firms, and software companies stopped making their own processors. Separation of this kind happens when the interfaces between layers become stable and well defined, so that a part made by one firm reliably works with parts made by others. The robotics equivalent would be a wide variety of robot bodies built on a shared layer of robot intelligence. One possible form is a single dominant robot model used by many hardware makers, in the way many phone manufacturers share one operating system, with chips as the one layer that ends up concentrated among a few suppliers.
There is nevertheless a strong case for going vertical early. Buying each component from a specialist supplier looks sensible when every sourcing decision is judged on its own, but the decisions add up to strategic exposure. Suppliers can move up the value chain: a chassis maker that sells to robot companies can start selling complete robots of its own, turning its former customers into resellers of a competitor's product. A long chain of suppliers is also slow to change, because every design revision must be negotiated across several firms with their own schedules and priorities, and this matters when the product changes every few months. Each interface between suppliers is, in addition, an opening for a newcomer to insert a better part and capture margin. The electric-car industry followed this pattern. Chinese carmakers that built most of their parts in-house went from marginal players to dominant ones, and one leading maker produces about 75% of its parts itself, which lets it redesign a vehicle and its components together and cut cost at every step. Robotics shows early signs of the same dynamic: about 87% of humanoids shipped in 2025 were Chinese, and one leading humanoid maker produces 86% of its components in-house (figures from the article cited in Sources).
Integration does not have to be permanent. Industries tend to integrate while the product is changing quickly, because the cost of coordinating across company boundaries is highest when designs are still moving, and to specialise once the product settles and interfaces can be fixed in standards. Owning the stack also does not mean making every part. Commodity components such as fasteners, bearings or standard connectors can still be bought (2.2), while the elements that determine how fast the product improves, namely the robot's design, its software and model, and its deployment, stay in-house. The aim is control over the rate of improvement of the whole system, not self-sufficiency for its own sake.
8.2 Who owns the customer
The company that holds the customer relationship decides, to a large extent, what the business can do and what it will want to do. The customer determines the requirements, the sales cycle, the regulatory obligations and the kind of evidence needed to close a deal. A company selling to the military must meet procurement rules, security clearances and long qualification programmes, and it becomes organised around them; a company selling to consumers lives on brand, price, distribution and support at scale. Over time the two become very different organisations, even if they started with similar technology.
Owning the customer is not always the best position. A new technology company often lacks the brand, service network, financing arrangements and trust that an established manufacturer has built over decades. In those cases it can be better to let the incumbent keep its brand and its customer relationship while the newcomer supplies the technology underneath. One autonomy company, for example, runs self-driving trucks under another manufacturer's brand: the manufacturer sells and services the vehicle, and the autonomy company provides the driving system. The trade-off is that the supplier gives up some margin and direct customer insight in exchange for faster distribution and lower selling costs.
8.3 Market size for general robot models
Language models offer a useful comparison. In 2016 it would have been hard to estimate the market for general language models, because AI was then sold as narrow products, one for translation, another for speech recognition, another for spam filtering, each trained for a single task. Once a single general model could perform many such tasks, the addressable market turned out to be most of digital knowledge work, wherever text is read, written or analysed.
The equivalent market for general robot models is physical labour. Today's robots cost six or seven figures partly because each one is engineered and programmed for a single job: integrators design custom fixtures, write task-specific motion programs and tune the system on site, and that engineering is a large share of the total cost. When the task changes, much of that work must be redone. General software that runs on many kinds of hardware, and that can be taught a new task with demonstrations rather than reprogramming, could reduce this integration cost sharply and make automation viable for jobs that currently do not justify it. This is a projection, and it depends on the technology working reliably in real settings.
8.4 Timing
Timing errors are punished in both directions. A company that arrives two years early typically runs out of money before the market exists; one that arrives two years late finds the market already crowded. Being early earns nothing, because there is no consolation prize for having been right first. One driverless-car company that was technically ahead of many rivals was shut down anyway after a serious public incident led regulators to withdraw its permission to operate, which showed that technical lead alone does not secure survival.
Enabling technologies can also exist long before they become useful. Wearable capture, in which a person wears sensors or cameras that record their movements while performing a task, was known to work by 2018. The data it produced had no good use, however, until training techniques developed for language models, such as large transformer architectures able to learn from varied demonstrations, matured in 2024. A company built around wearable capture in 2018 would have had the right data source and no way to turn it into a capable robot.
8.5 Why small teams can compete
In language modelling, the training data already existed in the form of the public internet, so the main constraint was computing power, and whoever spent most on computing tended to win. Robotics is more open. Nobody yet holds a large body of robot interaction data, because such data must be physically collected, through teleoperation, wearable capture or deployed robots, at real cost and real time. A large budget therefore cannot buy a head start in the way it could with internet text.
Large companies still have real advantages: more money, more experienced staff, more computing capacity, and the ability to collect data quickly once they commit to a direction. A small team's opening is focus. By going deep on specific paid work, it can collect data from deployments it already runs, which yields examples drawn from exactly the conditions its robots must handle, along with revenue and customer feedback. This creates a data flywheel, in which deployments generate data, data improves the model, and a better model wins more deployments. Competition should be expected to arrive fast. Once any company shows early results in a niche, others are capable of following quickly.
8.6 Value capture and geopolitics
- The US is unlikely to out-manufacture China, but it can lead in the AI that controls robots. Most of the value is expected to sit in that layer, because a robot body without capable control software can perform little useful work, while the same software can run across many bodies and improves with every deployment.
- Leading in manufacturing does not guarantee capturing the value. China's crowded and heavily subsidised markets drive prices down until profit margins are thin, and the rapid movement of engineers and suppliers between competing firms spreads technical know-how, making it hard for any single company to keep an advantage.
- Chinese manufacturers lead on cost and on iteration speed, helped by dense local supplier networks that can produce new parts within days. US companies typically compete on software and on integration with business customers, including the ability to fit robots into existing enterprise systems, workflows and compliance requirements.
- Sovereign AI refers to the desire of countries to have physical AI built and controlled within their own borders, because it touches defence, critical infrastructure and sensitive data. Restrictions on foreign robots for government-funded buyers are likely, because robots carry cameras and microphones that can see and hear everything around them and contain communications hardware that could transmit what they record. A US company with a supply chain outside China gains an advantage under these policies, since it can sell to buyers who are barred from using components of certain origins.
8.7 Capital structures
Robotics companies are typically financed in stages. Early rounds, often called seed and Series A, fund the team and the first prototypes on the strength of the founders and the idea; later rounds fund manufacturing, deployment and scaling on the strength of measured traction. Each round sells a share of the company at a price, and existing holders are diluted, meaning their percentage ownership falls as new shares are issued. Because robotics is capital-intensive (hardware must be designed, built, tested and deployed before revenue scales), founders and investors in the field encounter a wider range of financing structures than in pure software.
- SPV (special purpose vehicle): a legal entity created to pool several investors so that they appear as a single line on a company's cap table (the record of who owns which shares). SPVs are often used to gain access to a popular private funding round, where the company wants few direct shareholders. A deal offered through several stacked SPVs, one investing in another, can be a real opportunity, but it can also be a warning sign. Each layer typically charges its own fees and share of profits, which erode returns, and deals that reach investors through long chains are sometimes those that better-informed investors passed on. Information rights and the ability to verify what the SPV actually holds also weaken with each layer.
- Closed-end fund: a fund that issues a fixed number of shares, which then trade on a stock exchange like those of a company. Investors who want out sell their shares to other investors rather than redeeming them from the fund. This is why, unlike an ETF (exchange-traded fund), which must be able to create and redeem shares continuously and so holds mostly liquid securities, a closed-end fund can hold large stakes in illiquid private companies. A publicly traded closed-end fund generally cannot charge carry, the share of investment profits that private fund managers usually take.
- NAV (net asset value), premium, and discount: NAV is the value of what a fund holds, divided across its shares. Because the shares trade on an exchange, their market price is set by supply and demand and can sit above the NAV (a premium) or below it (a discount). Premiums arise when investors value access to assets they cannot buy elsewhere; discounts arise when investors doubt the reported valuations or the managers.
- Premium crystallization: if a fund trades above its NAV, issuing new shares at the market price raises the value backing each existing share instead of simply diluting it, because each new share brings in more assets than its proportionate claim. For example, take $100 of assets trading at 3x NAV and issue 10 percent new shares. The new buyers pay three times the NAV of what they receive, so the fund grows to $130, and value per share rises about 18 percent after dilution. Some acquisition-driven companies and companies holding treasury assets have grown value this way. The mechanism works only while the premium lasts; if the market price falls to or below NAV, issuing shares no longer adds value per share.
- Why it matters: Robotics will need tens of billions of dollars over time, more than private venture capital alone can supply, so choices about which investors, which structures, public markets and government money deserve attention early. Funding is also concentrating, with the largest reported rounds for robot-model companies now in the billions.
8.8 Jevons paradox
Jevons paradox is the observation that when a resource becomes cheaper or more efficient to use, total consumption of it often rises rather than falls. It was first noticed with coal: more efficient steam engines used less coal per unit of work, which might have been expected to reduce coal demand, but the lower cost of power made steam engines worthwhile in many more industries, and total coal consumption grew. The effect occurs when demand is highly sensitive to price, so that a fall in cost unlocks enough new uses to outweigh the savings on existing ones.
Applied to robotics, cheaper robot labour will do more than substitute for existing labour spending. It will also expand the market by making it economic to automate tasks that were never worth automating at previous costs, such as low-volume, highly varied or intermittent work for which a custom-engineered robot could never pay back its integration cost. The size of the eventual market therefore cannot be estimated simply from current spending on the labour that robots would replace.
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